Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1978

West Gallery Corporation v. Salt Lake City Board
of Commissioners et al : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
John D. O'Connell; Attorney for Appellants;
Roger Cutler; Attorney for Respondents;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, West Gallery Corp. v. Salt Lake City Board of Commissioners, No. 15749 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1217

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WEST GALLERY CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation, dba
GALLERY THEATERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 15749

SALT LAKE CITY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, et. al.,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from an order denying Appellant••
motion for summary judgment and petit:i.c:a .
for extraordinary relief rendered by·
i.
Honorable David J. Dee, Judge of the~
District Court
·. '. ·~·:.

t• .

ROGER CUTLER
Salt Lake City Attorney
101 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Respondents

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WEST GALLERY CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation, dba
GALLERY THEATERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 15749

SALT LAKE CITY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, et. al.,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

i

Appeal from an order denying Appellant's
motion for summary judgment and petition
for extraordinary relief rendered by the
Honorable David J. Dee, Judge of the Third
District Court

I
JOHN D. O'CONNELL
Twelve Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant

I

ROGER CUTLER
Salt Lake City Attorney
101 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Respondents

i
I

I

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

1

RELIEF SOUGHT

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT

3

THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS A
CITY FROM SUPPRESSING, BY MEANS OF
LICENSE SUSPENSION, THE EXHIBITION
OF FILMS WHICH ARE NOT OBSCENE
BASED UPON CONVICTIONS OF THE EXHIBITOR OF EXHIBITING OTHER FILMS
WHICH WERE FOUND TO BE OBSCENE.
CONCLUSION

17

CASES CITED
Alexander v. City of St. Paul
227 N.W.2d 370 (Minn. 1975)

13, 14

Avon 42nd Street Corporation vs.
Myerson, 352 F.Supp 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)

13

City of Delevan v. Thomas
31 Ill.App.3d 630, 334 ND2d 190 (1975)

12, 13

City of Seattle v. Bittner
81 Wash.2d 747, 505 P.2d 126 (1973)

12

Conunonwealth ex. rel. Davis v. Van Emberg
847 A.2d 712 (Pa. 1975)
Forsyth Corporation v. Bishop, 362 F.Supp
1389 (M.D. Ga. 1972), aff, 182 F.2d 280
(4 Cir. 1973, cert. den. 422 U.S. 1044
i

8

14, 15

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

Page
Fortune Society v. McGinnis,
319 F.Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)

14

General Corp. v. Sweeton, 320 So.2d
668 (Ala. 1975), cert. den.,
U.S.
, 96 S.Ct. 14g.r;-47---r:-:-Ed.2d 753 (1976)

7, 8

Giarrusso v. D'Iberville Gallery
295 So.2d 891 (La.App. 1974)

7

Gulf States Theaters of Louisiana v.
Richardson, 287 So.2d 480 (La. 1974)

7

Kansas v. A Motion Picture Entitled "The
Bet", 547 P.2d 760 (Kan. 1976)

7

Near v. Minnesota, 238 U.S. 697,
51 S.Ct. 625 (1931)

5, 6 I 7 I

New Riviera Arts Theater v. Davis
219 Tenn. 652, 412 S.W.2d 890 (1967)

7

Ogden City, et. al. vs. Eagle Books,
et. al.,

9

Palmigiano v. Travisono
317 F.Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
People ex. rel. Busch v. Projection
Room Theater,
C.3d
, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 328 550 P.2d 600 (June 1, 1976)
Perrine v. Municipal Court, 5 C.3d 656,
97 Cal. Rptr. 320, 488 P.2d 648 (1971)
cert. den., 404 U.S. 1038, 92 St. Ct.
710, 3CJL.Ed.2d 2d 729

l~

Appendix

14

7

11, 12

Sanders v. State
2 31 Ga • 6 0 8 , 2 0 3 S . E . 2 d 15 3 ( 19 7 4 )
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,
394 U.S. 147 (1969)
ii

14

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

society to Oppose Pornography, Inc.
v. Thevis, 255 So.2d 876 (La.App. 1972)
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. vs.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 95 S.Ct. 1239,
43 L.Ed. 448 (1975)

7

16

Speight v. Slaton
415 U.S. 333, 94 S.Ct. 1098, 39 L.Ed.2d
367 (1974)

9

State ex. rel Blee v. Mohoney Enterprises
289 N.E.2d 519 (Ind. App. 1973)

8

State ex. rel. Field v. Hess
540 P. 2d 1165 (Okla. 1975)
Younger v. Harris
401 U.S. 37

9

ORDINANCES CITED
Salt Lake City Revised Ordinances
§20-3-9

2

Salt Lake City Revised Ordinances
§20-20-1

3

Salt Lake City Revised Ordinances
§20-20-11

2, 4

iii

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servi
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WEST GALLERY CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation, dba
GALLERY THEATERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, et. al.,

Case No. 15749

Defendants-Respondents.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This was an action brought pursuant to Rules 57 and
65 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to declare respondents'
suspension of appellant's business, theater and soft drink
licenses invalid and to arrest the implementation of the
suspension.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter came on for hearing before the District
Court on appellant's motion for summary judgment.

The

District Court, with the concurrence of the parties, determined that no facts were in issue and entered an order
denying appellant's motion and further denying appellant's
petition for extraordinary relief.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of the Order of the
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District Court with direction to grant appellant

extraordi:.,
relief necessary to protect its rights under the F'
irst Amer.:
ment to the United States Constitution.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 5, 197 6, the then president of plaintiff
corporation, James Piepenburg, was convicted in the Distric:
Court of exhibiting an obscene motion picture, "Mernorhs
Within Miss Aggie", in violation of §32-3-10 of the Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake City.

On August 25, 1976, the plai:'

corporation was convicted in Salt Lake City Court of exhibit·
ing an obscene motion picture, "Teenage Cover Girls", in vi:·
lation of the same ordinance.
On September 2, 197 6, the Mayor and the Board of Commi1
sioners, acting through the Salt Lake City Attorney's Office
served notice upon the plaintiff to appear before the Board
Commissioners on October 7, 1976, in a matter termed "Order
to Show Cause".

This notice stated that the hearing was to

be conducted pursuant to §20-3-9

and §20-20-11 of the Re-

vised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, which purport to authori
the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City to revoke the
business licenses of any persons whom the Commission finds
has violated any ordinance of Salt Lake City or whom the
Commission finds to have been convicted for any such violati

-2-
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The grounds for revocation were the aforementioned convictions.
A hearing was held on October 9, 1977, before the
defendant Board of Commissioners and the Board entered Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Decision suspending plaintiff's licenses for nine (9) months.

The effect of the

suspension has been stayed pursuant to an agreement of counsel
and an Order of the United States District Court until such
time as this case is resolved.
Plaintiff-appellant brought this action, at the suggestion of the U. S. District Court, seeking to have the suspension declared invalid and its implementation arrested.
A number of grounds were alleged, however, the issues were
narrowed in the District Court below to the single issue .
raised by this appeal.
ARGUMENT
THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS A CITY FROM SUPPRESSING, BY MEANS OF LICENSE SUSPENSION,
THE EXHIBITION OF FILMS WHICH ARE NOT
OBSCENE BASED UPON CONVICTIONS OF THE
EXHIBITOR OF EXHIBITING OTHER FILMS WHICH
WERE FOUND TO BE OBSCENE.
The applicable sections of the Revised Ordinances of
Salt Lake City provide:
§20-20-1. Theater or hall operation. License
required.
It shall be unlawful for any person
to operate any theater, motion picture show,
concert hall or other place of amusement
not otherwis~ licensed by this Title without first obtaining a license to do so.

-3-
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§20-20-11.
Obscene Films Prohibited. It
shall be unlawful for any person to hold,
conduct, or carry on or permit to be held
con~u~t~d, or carried on any motion pictu;e,
ex~ibit~on, or entertainment of any sort
which violates Chapter 2, Section 10 or
Chapter 7, Section 7 of Title 32, or'
Chapter 20, Section 18.l of Title 20 of the
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah,
1965, as amended.
Upon a finding by the
Board of Salt Lake City Commissioners of a
violation after hearing, or upon a conviction
of any person of the aforesaid violations
occurring in or on premises licensed under
Chapter 20 of this Title, the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City may revoke or
suspend the license or licenses covering
businesses conducted on such premises, regardless of the license ownership thereof.
It is respectfully submitted that the defendants are
acting under the color of the above City Ordinances of Salt
Lake City to "lock up" and restrain a constitutionally gum
teed right, i.e., freedom of speech and expression.

It mus:

be noted that defendants are not limiting their curtailment
of plaintiff's right to exhibit films to those films which
are "obscene", but are attempting to prohibit plaintiff fro:
exhibiting any film.

Clearly, films which have been judicia.

determined to be obscene are not protected by the First Amer:
ment.

The issue here is whether the defendants can block

the exhibition of material which is protected by the First
Amendment because plaintiff has been convicted of exhibitin:
films which were not protected.

The overwhelming weight

of authority is clearly that such action is unconstitution~

-4-
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The courts of this nation have universally condemned
prior restraint of speech and press, save in the most extraordinary of circumstances.

In the leading United States

supreme Court case of Near v. Minnesota, 238 U.S. 697, 51
s. Ct. 625 (1931), the Court struck down a prior restraint
very similar to that involved in the present case.

The Near

case involved a situation where a Minnesota statute provided
for the prospective abatement of publications found to be
either obscene or libelous, 1 based on the theory that such
publications were enjoinable as nuisances.

The lower courts

believed that the defendant in that case had made libelous
accusations against members of the local government, and
thus had engaged in conduct unprotected by the First Amendment.
Accordingly, they felt no impropriety existed in enjoining the

1
Chapter 285 of the Session Laws of Minnesota, 1925,
declared:
"Section 1. Any person ..• engaged in .•• producing,
publishing or circulating, having in possession, selling
or giving away
(a) an obscene, lewd and lascivisious newspaper,
magazine or other periodical, or
(b) a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical; is guilty of nuisance ••• "
Section 2 provided an injunction to abate any nuisance
found in Section 1.

-5-
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defendant from all future publications, since he had abused
his First Amendment rights in the past.

The United States

Supreme Court reversed, characterizing the state's conduct
as unconstitutional prior restraint on protected First Arnenc·
ment rights.

The Court stated:

If we cut through mere details of procedure, the operation and effect of the
statute in substance is that public
authorities may bring the owner or
publisher of a newspaper or periodical
before a judge upon the charge of con-·
ducting a business of publishing
scandalous and defamatory matter ...
and [unless innocence is proven] his
newspaper or periodical is suppressed
and further publication is made punishable as contempt. This is the essence
of censorship. 238 U.S. at 713, 51
s. Ct. at 630, L.Ed. at 1366.
The Court then added:
[T]his decision rests upon the operation and effect of the statute, without regard to the question of the
truth of the charges contained in the
particular periodical. 238 U.S. at
723, 51 S. Ct. at 633, 75 L.Ed. at
1371.
Thus, the Court made it clear that even if the defendant in'
case had been formally convicted of abusing his First Aroendoc
rights by making libelous statements, this would not justify
that state in prospectively denying his right to freely expr'
himself in the future.
Finally, the Near Court also Pol.. nted out that comrnercia!
entities are equally entitled to First Amendment protections

-6-
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as non-commercial entities:
Characterizing the publication as a
business, and the business as a
nuisance, does not permit an invasion
of the constitutional immunity against
restraint. 283 U.S. at 720.
While the Near decision dealt with prospective restraints upon a newspaper publisher allegedly engaging in
libel, more recent decisions have dealt specifically with
the abatement of adult theaters as nuisances.

With apparent

unanimity, the state courts have found the doctrine of prior
restraints to be entirely applicable to prevent the padlocking
of adult theaters as nuisances after specific films were
adjudged obscene:
Theater,

C.3d

People ex. rel. Busch v. Projection Room
, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 550 P.2d 600

(June 1, 1976); General Corp. v. Sweeton, 320 So.2d 668
(Ala. 1975), cert.denied,

U.S.

, 96 S.Ct. 1494, 47

L.Ed.2d 753 (1976); Kansas v. A Motion Picture Entitled "The
Bet", 547 P.2d·760 (Kan. 1976); Gulf States Theaters of
Louisiana v. Richardson, 287 So.2d 480 (La. 1974); Society to
Oppose Pornography, Inc., vs. Thevis, 255 So.2d 876 (La. App.
1972); Giarrusso v. D'Iberville Gallery, 295 So.2d 891 (La.
App. 1974); New Riviera Arts Theater v. Davis, 219 Tenn.
652, 412 S.W.2d 890 (1967).

Similarly,· the doctrine of

prior restraints has been held to preclude a state from closing
down a bookstore as a nuisance after a finding that it had

-7-
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sold obscene books or magazines:

State ex. rel. Blee v.

Mohoney Enterprises, 289 N.E.2d 519 (Ind. App. 1973);
Sanders v. State, 231 Ga. 608, 203 S.E.2d 153 (1974)·,

~

ex. rel. Field v. Hess, 540 P.2d 1165 (Okla. 1975); co~.
wealth ex. rel. Davis v. Van Emberg, 847 A2d 712 (Pa. 197))
The rationale underlying all these cases was perhaps
summarized in General Corporation v. Sweeton, supra.

be~

Theii

the Alabama Supreme Court stated:
The decree of the trial court included an
order closing the Fox Theater for any purpose
for one year.
This is not a liquor nuisance
nor a prostitution nuisance; rather, a movie
house charged with showing certain obscene
motion pictures. Evidence of obscene conduct
in the past does not justify enjoining future
conduct which is protected by the First Amendment ... The padlocking of appellant's operation
~one year constitutes prior restraint at
its worst and is patently unconstitutional.
320 So.2d at 675. (Emphasis added.)
The Alabama Law on Obscenity ... provides criminal
penalties for conduct such as appellant's if
retributive punishment is sought, those sanctions, not abatement, are the only proper
ones-authorized by the legislature ... [E]ven
if one is guilty of maintaining an obscenity
nuisance, it is not constitutionally permissible to deprive him prospectively of his
First Amendment rights. 320 So.2d at 676.
(Emphasis added.)
The Court went on to point out that states could constitut::
ally enjoin the future showing of specific individual fill!!
found to be obscene (assuming proper procedures were used),
t blanketly close downt~
but reaffirmed that they Could no
based on past violations of the obscenity laws.
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The doctrine that past abuses of the First Amendment do
not justify the suppression, via a nuisance action, of future
distribution of materials which may or may not be obscene, was
applied recently by the District Court of Weber County in
Ogden City, et. al., v. Eagle Books, et. al.

A copy of the

Memorandum Decision rendered in that case by the Honorable
Ronald O. Hyde is attached as Appendix A and clearly establishes that while an injunction can issue restraining the: distribution of specific works which have been found obscene,
it would be unconstitutional to restrain distribution of all
future material because the distributor had been found guilty
of distributing obscene material in the past.
In Speight v. Slaton, 415 U.S. 333, 94 S.Ct. 1098, 39
L.Ed.2d 367

(1974), the United States Supreme Court clearly

implied that it would be impermissible to close down a bookstore merely because a bookstore owner had been found to have
sold obscene materials in violation of state law.

The Speight

case originated in a three judge federal district court in
Georgia.

The District Court had been asked to declare Georgia's

obscenity nuisance abatement statute (which mandated the
closure of businesses found to have violated the obscenity
laws) an unconstitutional prior restraint on the sale of other
books which may or may not be obscene.

The district court

abstained pursuant to the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401

-9-
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U.S. 37.

On appeal, the United States Supreme Court noted

with approval that the Georgia Supreme Court had held this:.
nuisance statute to constitute an impermissible prior restr,
in the case of Sanders v. State, supra, which was decided (
Speight was being appealed.

Consequently, the Court pointe:

out that a proper remedy was clearly available in Georgia's
state courts and approved the District Court's decision to
abstain.

The Supreme Court characterized the Sanders caset

this manner:
As we understand the Georgia court's
decision, the operation of a bookstore
could not be enjoined merely because
some of its merchandise had been
judicially determined to be obscene ...
We therefore vacate the judgment below
and remand to the District Court for
reconsideration in light of the decision
of the Georgia Supreme Court in Sanders
v. State, supra, 415 U.S. at 334-35.
For constitutional purposes, the closing of a theater asa
nuisance is no different from the revocation or suspension
of the theater's license for having shown an obscene fiID.
In both cases the ultimate result is that the theater will
be prohibited from showing films in the future that are pre·
sumptively protected merely because one of its past fi~s
was adjudicated to be obscene.

This is prior restraint at

its worst.
A number of recent cases in lower courts have dealt

-10-
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with the precise question of whether a business license can be
revoked or refused on the basis of a past violation of obscenity laws.

With only one exception, the courts have unanimously

rejected this approach as an unconstitutional prior restraint.
In Perrine v. Municipal Court, 5 C.3d 656, 97 Cal. Rptr.
320, 488 P.2d 648 (1971), certiorari denied, 404 U.S. 1038,
92 S.Ct. 710, 30 L.Ed.3d2d 729, the California Supreme court,
sitting ~ bane, recently held that the First Amendment prohibits the denial of a license to operate a bookstore to a
man previously convicted of violating the obscenity law.

In

the Court's own words:
[I]t is constitutionally impermissible to
deny an applicant a license to operate a
bookstore solely upon the ground that he has
suffered a prior criminal conviction. 5 C3d,
659, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 321, 488 P.2d at 649.
The Court's reasoning, in relevant portions, is set forth below:
[S]ince a denial of a license would prohibit
petitioner from engaging in an activity protected by the First Amendment, it could only
be justified, even under a narrowly drawn
ordinance, if permitting a person who had been
convicted of a crime involving obscenity to
operate a bookstore constituted a clear and
present danger of a serious substantive evil.
[Citations omitted.] No such clear and present danger appears ••.
The penalty for violating sect~o~ ~11.2
[selling, distributing, or exhib~ting obscene
matter] does not include a forfeiture of
First Amendment rights, and the risk that
criminal sanctions will be insufficient to
deter future violations of that section cannot justify the county's attempted forfeiture
-11-
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of those rights on the theory that past
violators are unfit to operate bookstores.
5 C.3d at 664-65, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 325,
488 P.2d at 653.
(Emphasis added.)

In City of Seattle v. Bittner, 81 Wash.2d 747, 505 P,
126 (1973), the City had denied

a

renewal application for

motion picture theater license due to its finding that thE

applicant's officers had been convicted of exhibiting obsc
films.

The Supreme Court of Washington held that the licE

ing ordinances constituted an impermissible prior restrair

to the extent that they prohibited the showing of any filn

in the future, notwithstanding the prior obscenity convict
The Court stated:
[W]e are convinced that the constitution
does not permit a licensing agency to
deny to any citizen the right to exercise
one of his fundamental freedoms on the
ground that he has abused that freedom
in the past. No case is cited which supports such a proposition and our research
has revealed none.
81 Wash.2d at 756, 505
P.2d at 131.
In City of Delevan v. Thomas, 31 Ill.App.3d 630, 334
NE2d 190 (1975), the defendant was convicted of operating
business without a license after his license had been revr
for showing an obscene motion picture.

The court revers~

the conviction as constituting an unconstitutional prior
restraint on protected First Amendment freedoms.

In that

case, the court found not only that premising a revocatio
on a past conviction was impermissible, but it also found

-12-
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that in any event, a procedure whereby the mayor of the city
could make his own determination of obscenity violated constitutionally protected procedural safeguards as well.

The

court summarized the inherent evil in this situation as follows:
The licensing regulation in the case before
us is an obvious attempt to prevent defendant
from showing all future films, whether obscene or not, by means of a license revocation predicated on an administrative determination that one obscene film was shown ...
This scheme is ... fatally defective as an
attempt at censorship ... 334 NE2d at 193.
In Avon 42nd Street Corporation v. Myerson, 352 F.Supp.
994 (S.D. N.Y. 1972), a federal district court struck down
a city licensing ordinance which permitted revocation of a
theater license upon a conviction for showing an obscene
motion picture.

The court held:

To permit the suspension of a theater on
the basis of a prior conviction even for
obscenity, amounts to an unconstitutional
suppression of protected freedom of expression. 352 F.Supp. at 998.
Finally, in Alexander v. City of St. Paul, 227 NW2d 370
(Minn. 1975), the Minnesota Supreme Court struck down a city
ordinance permitting the revocation of a theater license
based on a conviction of exhibiting obscene materials.

The

court's opinion reflected a comprehensive analysis and some
of its rationale is set forth below:
It has been suggested that the power of
-13-
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....
the c~ty t<? grant or deny a license to operate
a motion picture theater is coextensive with
the power of the city to grant or deny a lice
to operate any other legitimate business. Pro~se
ponents of this argument point to the fact
that the city may deny a license to sell liquor
or to operate a massage parlor to an applicant
who has been convicted of a crime bearing a
reasonable relationship to the business for
which the license is sought. They argue by
analogy that the city may also deny a license
to operate a motion picture theater to a applicant who has been convicted of a crime relating to obscenity. However, when the city
licenses a motion picture theater, it is
licensing an activity protected by the First
Amendment, and as a result, the power of the
city is more limited than when the city
licenses activities which do not have First
Amendment protection, such as the business of
selling liquor or running a massage parlor.
227 NW2d at 372-73
(Emphasis added.)
The court went on to hold that the city's license revocatit
ordinance was an unconstitutional prior restraint.

The cor

cited a long list of cases in support of its holding and fo:
only one case holding to the contrary, that being Forsyth
Corp. v. Bishop, 362 F. Supp. 1389 (M.D. Ga. 1972), aff, 1il
F.2d 280 (4 Cir. 1973), cert. den. 422 U.S. 1044, the case:
lied upon by Salt Lake City and the District Court below in
the present case.

It is respectfully submitted that the

Forsyth case is an aberration and violated the principles
enunciated in the United States Supreme Court in the cases
of Near v. Minnesota, supra, and Shuttlesworth v. Ci!J'..£f
Birmingham, supra, and additionally is out of line with the
great weight of authority holding that both nuisance abate·
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ments and license revocations based on prior obscenity violations are unconstitutional as prior restraints.

The

reasoning of Forsyth is based on the theory that since persons
convicted of violating obscenity ordinances can be imprisoned
with incidental infringement of First Amendment rights,
licenses can be revoked with the "incidental" loss of First
Amendment rights.

This argument misconstrues the law of

prisoner rights and the meaning of "incidental".

It is clear

that even convicted felons have First Amendment rights which
may only be curtailed to the extent necessary to protect a
compeling state interest centering about prison security,
or a clear and present danger of a breach of prison discipline, or some substantial interference with orderly institutional administration.

E.g., Fortune Society v. McGinnis,

319 F.Supp 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Palmigiano v. Travisono,
317 F.Supp. 776 (D.R.!. 1970).

Therefore, even if an individual

were imprisoned for an obscenity violation, he could not be
prevented from continuing to operate a theater on the outside.
A more glaring error by the court in Forsyth was to
denominate the revocation of a license, to conduct a business
presumptively protected by the First Amendment, as an "incidental" loss of rights.

The curtailment of rights of prisoners

may be incidental to an overriding necessity to protect prison
security, for example.

If the purpose was simply to stifle
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the expression of the prisoner as part of th e punis
· hinent,
1
would not be

11

incidental 11 to a legitimate purpose but a

dire9t attack on the prisoner's First Amendment rights.
The shutting down of the Gallery Theater is the ~obj,

-..

of the City's action complained of here.

It is not rntreli

incidental to some other overriding legitimate purpose.
In closing, this admonition from the Supreme Court in
the case of Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. vs. Conrad, 420
U.S. 546, 95 S. Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed. 448 (1975) should be
remembered:
[A] free society prefers to punish the
few who abuse rights of speech after they
break the law than to throttle them and
all others beforehand.
It is always difficult to know in advance what an individual
will say, and the line between legitimate
and illegitimate speech is often so finely
drawn that the risks of freewheeling
censorship are formidable.
420 U.S. at 559,
95 S. Ct. 1239, 1246; 43 L.Ed.2d at 459
(1975).

The defendants may punish plaintiff and its agentscy
fines and imprisonment for abusing their First Amendment
rights.

The defendants may also prevent the exhibition of

specific films which are obscene and hence outside the
protection of the First Amendment.

However, the First All~

ment clearly prohibits the total suppression of the exhibi~

of all films whether this suppression is attempted by liceJi
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suspension, restraining order, "nuisance abatement" or
otherwise.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the District Court below erred
in granting respondents' motion for summary judgment and
denying appellant's petition for extraordinary relief and it
is respectfully submitted that this Court should reverse the
Order and direct the District Court to grant appellant relief
necessary to protect its rights under the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution.

·71w~::zr
~.

;::;;0 I CONNELL
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) copies of
the foregoing upon the attorney for the respondents, Roger
Cutler, by leaving same at the Salt Lake City Attorney's
Office, 101 City & County Building, Salt Lake City, Utah,
on the

~~~day

of May, 1978.
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APPENDIX A

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

OGDEN CITY and WEBER COUNTY, /
Plaintiffs,

I

vs.

I

EAGLE BOOKS, et. al.,

I

Defendants.

I

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Civil No.

67644

This matter is presented to the Court on Motions for
Summary Judgment on the part of plaintiffs and defendants.
The Complaint in this action is a two-cause complaint; the
first cause of action alleging that the defendants have
committed the crime of distribution of pornographic materials and is therefore a public nuisance, with a prayer
that they be permanently enjoined from further maintaining
the nuisance and that the defendants be enjoined to surrender
to the Sheriff of Weber County any material which is subject
to this action to be destroyed by the Sheriff, and that an
accounting be made of all monies and other considerations paid
as admission to view any materials determined to create a
public nuisance and that said monies be paid to the general
fund of Weber County.

The second cause of action requests

that the defendants be permanently restrained from doing
business without a license within Ogden City, Weber County,
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Utah.

Defendants claim that the license revocation and

nuisance action are unconstitutional.
Constitutional provision in question is the First Arne~
ment which states "Congress shall make no law respecting t
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercis,
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the prt;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances." The
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United Sta:
in part states "No state shall make or enforce any law whk
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of:
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person ofL
liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny t:
any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the
law."
The First Amendment has been ruled to apply to the sta'
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section 76-10-803, Utah Code Annotated, defines publii
nuisance as follows:

"(l)

A public nuisance is a crimear!

the order and economy of the State and consists in unlawful
doing any act or omitting to perform any duty, which act
or omission either: •.• (b) offends public decency."
76-10-1210(3) states:

Sectio:

"The commission of a crime under th;;

part shall be deemed to offend public decency (this part v..

-2-
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mean Chapter 12 which covers the sale of pornography).
Pornography is not protected by the First Amendment.
There has been approximately 30 sales which has
by the courts to be pornographic material.

been determined

As to each of those

sales under the Utah Code, each sale could be determined to
offend public decency.

Each sale therefore under the defini-

tion of the Statute could be construed to be a public nuisance.
As to each of the volumes adjudicated to be pornographic,
the relief requested by the City could be granted; that is
each of the volumes ruled to be pornographic could be enjoined
from further sale and the additional volumes of that particular book found to be pornographic could be ordered surrendered
to the Sheriff and the receipts forfeited.

If this were the

relief requested by plaintiffs, it could possibly be constitutionally permissible because pornographic material is
not protected by the First Amendment.

However, the relief

requested by plaintiffs is that because defendants have made
a sale or sales of books determined to be pornographic that
they be enjoined from any and all further sales and that they
be enjoined to surrender to the Sheriff of Weber County any
material which is subject to this action which would be their
total inventory, so that their total inventory could be destroyed and that an accounting be made of all monies and other
considerations paid as admission to view the materials be for-

-3-
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feited to the general fund of Weber County.
I do not interpret the Statute in question to be that
broad.

After having studied the briefs of the parties and:

cases cited therein, I rule as follows in regard to injunct.
and public nuisance:

the injunction provisions of 76-1~~

is limited to enjoining distribution of specific pieces of
material which have been ruled to be pornographic and there·
fore not protected by the First Amendment.

The statutory

provision cannot be used to enjoin the operation of a book·
store per se.

Such injunctive relief would be a prior rut

of material not judged to be pornographic.
of censorship and book-burning.

This is the

ess;

The injunctive relief as

requested by the City would not be constitutionally perrniss:
under the First Amendment.

It would be an unconstitutional

prior restraint which must be distinguished from constitufr
restraint of materials which have been judged to be pornographic under the standards established by the Supreme Cour'.
Therefore as to the plaintiffs' first cause of action, dr
fendants are granted summary judgment.
As to plaintiffs' second cause of action in regard to
enjoining defendants from doing business without a license,
defendants contend that the revocation of their license is
also prior restraint and therefore unconstitutional.
Plaintiffs' request an injunction but cite no authMll
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statutory or case law which would authorize such relief.

The

ordinance carries its own sanctions for violation - a daily
misdemeanor.

There is no authority for a restraining order

and there does not appear to be a need.

The sanctions of

the ordinance are greater than the sanctions of contempt.
The injunctive relief requested in plaintiffs' second cause
of action is denied and defendants are granted summary judgment.
The question of constitutionality of the ordinance does
not appear to be properly before this Court in this case.
It is not necessary to the decision and a ruling thereon would
at best be advisory only.
DATED this 20th day of October, 1977.

/s/
RONALD O. HYDE, JUDGE

[Emphasis Added]
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